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ABSTRACT
In the field of smartphones a number of proposals suggest that
sensing the ambient environment can act as an effective anti-relay
mechanism. However, existing literature is not compliant with in-
dustry standards (e.g. EMV and ITSO) that require transactions to
complete within a certain time-frame (e.g. 500ms in the case of EMV
contactless payments). In previous work the generation of an artifi-
cial ambient environment (AAE), and especially the use of infrared
light as an AAE actuator was shown to have high success rate in re-
lay attacks detection. In this paper we investigate the application of
infrared as a relay attack detection technique in various scenarios,
namely, contactless transactions (mobile payments, transportation
ticketing, and physical access control), and continuous Two-Factor
Authentication. Operating requirements and architectures are pro-
posed for each scenario, while taking into account industry imposed
performance requirements, where applicable. Protocols for inte-
grating the solution into the aforementioned scenarios are being
proposed, and formally verified. The impact on the performance
is assessed through practical implementation. Proposed protocols
are verified using Scyther, a formal mechanical verification tool.
Finally, additional scenarios, in which this technique can be applied
to prevent relay or other types of attacks, are discussed.
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1 INTRODUCTION
During a relay attack, an attacker is attempting to extend the physi-
cal distance between two communicating devices, using some form
of relay equipment. By performing this type of attack, an attacker
may gain access to services that a legitimate user is eligible for, like
payments, access to buildings, or access to user accounts.
In the domain of smart cards, distance bounding protocols have
been proposed in order to counter relay attacks [24, 37], whereas for
smartphones, distance bounding protocols are not applicable due to
the multitude of hardware components and the multi-process archi-
tecture which leads to unpredictable performance behaviour [39].
Relay attacks have been demonstrated in the field of smartphone-
based Near-Field Communication (NFC) transactions [19, 20, 42].
Ambient sensing has been proposed as a potential alternative
technique for countering relay attacks [23, 26, 34, 38, 40, 41]. This
method often requires the devices involved in a transaction to col-
lect data from their surrounding environment (e.g. the room tem-
perature) that can imply their coexistence when compared against
each other. However, the effectiveness of such techniques has been
found to be insufficient in the case of time restricted contactless
transactions [22, 33], like EMV contactless payment transactions,
that are required to be completed within 500ms [3, 5–7, 9].
The generation of an artificial ambient environment (AAE), using
infrared light, has demonstrated positive results regarding prox-
imity detection/relay attack prevention in short time frames [21]
(further details in Section 2.3). A random-bit sequence is emitted
through the infrared blaster of the smartphone, and captured by
the communicating party over a predefined short period (100ms).
Infrared blasters are available on a large portion of modern smart-
phones [32]. The emitted and captured data are then compared
against each other in order to establish proximity assurance.
Empirical evidence indicates that this technique is hard to re-
lay using off-the-shelf equipment, providing a strong proximity
detection/anti-relay mechanism against such attackers [21]. How-
ever, the applicability of this technique in real-world scenarios has
not been investigated. Moreover, the architectural enhancements,
limitations and requirements regarding the deployment in a large
scale have not been discussed.
The primary contributions of this paper are:
• We describe how infrared light can be employed as a means
of proximity detection/relay attack prevention in contactless
transactions in mobile payments, physical access control,
and transportation ticketing (Section 3).
• We propose a scheme for relay attack resilient continuous
Two-Factor Authentication (2FA), for host-based services
authentication (Section 4). Further possible scenarios are
discussed in Section 5.
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• We propose protocols that follow industry standards (where
applicable), for the integration of the proximity detection
technique. The security of all the protocols has been verified
using the Scyther tool1.
• We evaluate the performance of each of the aforementioned
cases by practically implementing them. Our results indicate
that the performance cost is low.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, background and related work are discussed.
2.1 Relay Attacks
A wide range of applications can be affected by relay attacks, like
contactless transactions, and access control. For example, in an
NFC-based contactless payment using a smartphone, an attacker
would have a malicious payment terminal and payment instrument.
The malicious payment terminal should be presented to a legitimate
user and the malicious payment instrument to a genuine payment
terminal. A transaction between the payment instrument and the
payment terminal will be initiated. All data communicated during
a transaction should be relayed between the malicious devices, as
shown in Figure 1. In this case, a transaction between the payment
instrument and the payment terminal will be performed, however
these devices can be beyond the operating environment of NFC.
Figure 1: Relay Attack
Relay attack detection and prevention requires information re-
garding the coexistence of the devices involved in the transaction.
As already mentioned, distance bounding protocols that are avail-
able for smart cards may not work in the field of smartphones. Sev-
eral alternative methods have been proposed regarding relay attack
prevention. Many of these methods have demonstrated that using
the environmental (ambient) sensors that are present in modern
smartphones can provide sufficient information (further discussion
regarding related work in Section 2.2).
In such scenarios, the devices involved in a transaction record
data, using some ambient sensor, for some predefined time. The
recorded data from the two devices is then transmitted to an entity
that performs a comparison, in order to decide whether the devices
are in vicinity. This entity can either be one of the devices involved
in the transaction, or a trusted third party (TTP).
However, the effectiveness of using data from the natural am-
bient environment in scenarios that require a limited time frame
(≤ 500ms), like EMV contactless payments [9], and transportation
related transactions [2, 17], has been questioned [22, 33]. The use of
artificial ambience has been proposed instead [21], as an effective
countermeasure.
1Scyther tool: https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/scyther/
2.2 Existing Anti-relay Mechanisms
Drimmer et al. [16] and Ma et al. [27] proposed the use of GPS
(Global Positioning System) as a means of co-location detection. A
time frame of 10 seconds was used by Ma et al. for data collection,
and values were recorded every second. High success rate was
reported by the authors for proximity detection.
Halevi et al. [23] proposed the use of ambient light and sound.
Values were captured for 30 and two seconds, respectively. The
authors used various comparison algorithms, and high success rate
was reported.
Varshavsky et al. [41] compared the WiFi networks, along with
the signal strengths, that the devices were able to detect. The main
objective of this work was device pairing, and positive results were
reported.
Urien et al. [40] combined ambient temperature and an elliptic-
curve based RFID and/or NFC authentication protocol. No per-
formance results were presented by the authors, as there was no
practical implementation.
Mehrnezhad et al. [30] recorded values using the accelerometer
of the devices involved in a payment transaction in order to detect
device co-location. A double tap was required in their proposal.
According to the authors, the transaction time lasted between 0.6
and 1.5 seconds, and a high success rate was observed.
Truong et al. [38] assessed a variety of sensors for proximity de-
tection. The recording time frame was between 10 and 120 seconds,
and positive results were reported.
Shrestha et al. [35] used a Sensordrone and recorded multiple
sensors. The precise sample duration is not provided in this work,
however the authors state that recordings lasted for a few seconds.
In [22] and [33], the effectiveness of recording the natural ambi-
ent environment in short transactions (up to 500ms) was empirically
evaluated, with different results from the existing literature. Com-
parison algorithms used in previous works, as well as machine
learning techniques, produced very high false negative results.
Further work on using the ambient environment for device co-
location has been performed in the field of two-factor authentica-
tion (2FA). Karapanos et al. [25] proposed using sound as a means of
proximity detection, for 2FA. The aim of the authors was to provide
a more usable 2FA method than the existing ones, in order to make
2FA more widely accepted.
2.3 Infrared as a Proximity Detection
Mechanism
As mentioned in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the natural ambient envi-
ronment may not provide sufficient information regarding the co-
existence of two devices in time restricted transactions. In [21],
a proximity detection technique was proposed, by generating an
artificial ambient environment (AAE). Infrared light was used to
evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed solution. This method
relies on a short transmission of a random-bit sequence, as pulses
and pauses, through the infrared transmitter of the smartphone,
over a period of 100ms , upon the initiation of a transaction. The
random-bit sequence is captured by the communicating party and
compared for similarity against the sequence generated by the
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smartphone. Infrared transmitters are available in a variety of An-
droid devices, and mainly used for controlling home equipment
(e.g. televisions) [11].
Each random bit in the sequence is represented by a 200µs long
pulse or pause, so 500 random bits are transmitted over the course
of 100ms . The infrared emitting side would therefore convert the
random-bit sequence to 200µs-long pulse/pause sequences. The
receiving side would translate the captured pulse and pause timings
back into a bit-sequence, using the same principle. For example, the
sequence “1101110011” would be converted into pulse and pause
timed sequences, as depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Representation of the Bit-Sequence “1101110011”
in pulses–pauses
Theoretically, the bit timings can be reduced to a minimum of
13µs/bit, as the frequency of the consumer infrared is 38.4kHz.
However, after experimentation we concluded that our evaluation
equipment was capable of reliably transmitting a single bit in no
less than 200µs .
Upon initiation of a transaction (e.g. through NFC or WiFi) be-
tween a transaction terminal (TT) and a transaction instrument
(TI), TI transmits, and TT receives infrared signals. The transaction
is initiated by device TT, which upon transmitting the transaction
initiation message starts listening for infrared signals for some pre-
defined time. Emission of the random-bit sequence is initiated by
device TI upon receiving the transaction initiation message.
The infrared communication acts as a second channel, in order
to detect whether the two devices are in proximity (Figure 3). The
transmitted and/or received data is transferred between the two
devices, or to a TTP, for comparison, in a secure manner through
the first channel.
Figure 3: Framework Architecture
Through experimentation, the similarity of the emitted and re-
ceived bits in a legitimate transaction reached or exceeded 98%,
in more than 98% of the experimental runs. The similarity of 98%
was therefore set as a threshold. Less than 2% false negative rate
was perceived in the working prototype. The smart card industry
accepts some amount of failure in transactions [31].
The challenge for an attacker is to successfully relay the bits
transmitted through the infrared channel in a timelymanner. In case
relaying of a bit is delayed, a pulse or pause will last longer, leading
to new bits being introduced in the random sequence. In case an
attacker uses caching techniques and delays the transmission of the
bits, some bits will not be received by the device TT, as they will be
emitted after the last has stopped listening for infrared signals. The
caching window for an attacker is approximately the 200µs , plus
the maximum time that a communication might need to initiate
(imposed by delays in the first communication channel – e.g. select
application ID APDU through the NFC channel). It was calculated to
be 4ms . In both occasions, if the similarity between the transmitted
and received bits does not reach the threshold of 98%, the relay
attack will be detected, and the transaction rejected.
Our experiments included six distinct relay techniques, using
both off-the-shelf, and custom-built equipment. None of the relay
techniques were capable of reaching the similarity threshold. The
detailed techniques and results are presented in [21]. However, the
integration of the technique in real world scenarios, related threat
models, potential architectures, and performance cost has not been
investigated. In the following sections we will be discussing and
evaluating the use of the technique in various scenarios, susceptible
to relay attacks.
3 CONTACTLESS TRANSACTIONS
Modern NFC-enabled smartphones are capable of performing smart
card-like contactless transactions. Domains that benefit from this
type of transactions include contactless payments, physical access
control and transport ticketing. This way of performing transac-
tions is convenient for the users, but due to security implications,
restrictions are usually imposed by the operators. For example, con-
tactless payments are limited to £30 per transaction in the UK [10].
These limitations apply in contactless transactions in general,
including smart cards. However, smartphones are susceptible to
more security threats. They usually do not contain secure storage,
their operating system is much larger, therefore more prone to
security flaws due to larger amount of coding errors [29], and users
have control over the software installed on a device.
Among the possible attacks on contactless transactions is the
relay attack. As already mentioned, in order to protect against relay
attacks, the coexistence of the devices involved in a transaction
should be able to be proven.
3.1 Threat Model
In a contactless transaction scenario, an attacker performing a relay
attack can use a legitimate user’s identity without authorisation.
Unauthorised access to services that the legitimate user is entitled
to can therefore be granted. For example, an attacker can perform
a payment using the legitimate user’s account, or get unauthorised
access to buildings.
For the attack to take place, a relay pair should be operated by an
attacker (Figure 1). A relay transaction instrument TI′, presented as
a legitimate transaction instrument, should be tapped to a legitimate
transaction terminal (TT) and initiate a transaction. Simultaneously,
the attacker should tap the relay device TT′ to a legitimate payment
instrument (TI). This can be achieved either by masquerading TT′
and presenting it to the legitimate user as a legitimate transaction
terminal, or by tapping it without the user’s consent.
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For a successful attack, the communication messages should be
relayed between the devices TI and TT, through the relay pair. As
already mentioned, according to the EMV standards, a transaction
should be completed within a time frame of 500ms . Similarly, in
the case of transport related transactions, a time restriction of
300 − 500ms is usually imposed [2]. Therefore, the relay equipment
should be capable of relaying all the communication data between
the legitimate device pair (TT – TI) in a timely manner.
In this paper, the attacker requires no prior interaction or knowl-
edge of neither TT nor TI; the attack is of opportunistic nature and
has only control over the devices TT′ and TI′. However, the poten-
tial implications if TT or TI are compromised are out of the scope
of this paper, since a relay attack may not be necessary to achieve
the same goals under these circumstances. We focus primarily on
the issue of genuine devices requiring proximity assurance in order
to conduct a legitimate transaction. Finally, the attacker only has
access to off-the-shelf relay equipment.
3.2 Candidate Integration Architecture
The anti-relay mechanism should be optimised in order to detect
relay attacks during the time frame of the transaction, as imposed
by industry standards. In order for the proposed solution to be
introduced to the existing infrastructure, an infrared receiver should
be available on payment terminals. Moreover, payment instruments
should be equipped with infrared blasters.
Since infrared light has a range of a fewmetres, a denial of service
attack can be achieved. However, the objective of the adversary,
described in Section 3.1, can still not be attained. A protective cover
around the infrared sensor can effectively prevent such attacks, by
blocking infrared light out of the range required for the payment
process from reaching the infrared sensor.
In order for the bit-sequence comparison to take place, three
pieces of information are required:
(1) The random-bit sequence generated and emitted by TI.
(2) The time required for TI to emit the information through
infrared.
(3) The infrared sequence captured by TT.
The second element is required because a delay (initialisation
time) was noticed before device TI could start emitting infrared.
After analysis of Android’s source code, we concluded that it is
induced due to the infrared driver of the device. Since the source
code of the driver is not publicly available, we are considering
this delay, as we were not able to reduce it (further discussion in
Section 3.5). However, since the total emission time (100ms) and
the total initialisation time are known, we are able to find the
time (relative to the initiation of the transaction), when device TI
started emitting infrared. Any infrared signals received by device
TT prior to the initiation of the emission, or after its completion
were discarded by the comparing party.
The average total infrared emission process time by device TI
was measured to be 226.66ms , in 300 runs of the experiment, using
a Samsung S5 mini (SM-G800F) device, running Android 5.1.1. In
order for the relay attack detection method to be performed during
the time of the transaction, the similarity comparison between the
transmitted and the captured bit-sequence has to be performed by
one of the devices involved in the transaction. The required data
should be transferred through a secure channel, in this occasion,
the NFC channel that is running in parallel.
In order to accelerate the relay attack detection technique, TI
can encrypt and transfer the random-bit sequence to TT, through
the NFC channel, in parallel to the infrared emission process. Since
the two devices are considered trusted, the security of the system is
maintained. Once the emission of the infrared is complete, the time
required for the process to complete is also transferred in a secure
manner from device TI to device TT. Device TT discards any bits
received outside the emission time-frame and proceeds with the
comparison of the emitted and received bits. The wdiff2 program is
responsible for the comparison process. If the computed similarity
is greater or equal to 98%, device TT responds with an approval
message to device TI. Contactless transactions tend to use either
public, or symmetric key cryptography, hence the integration of
the anti-relay mechanism was evaluated against these scenarios.
3.2.1 Public Key Based Protocol. In mobile payments and physi-
cal access control, public key cryptography is usually recommended
for use in related protocols, according to EMV [18] and NIST [28],
respectively. The protocol messages used for the secure exchange of
the required data between the two devices are listed in Protocol 1. A
mechanical formal verification of the protocol has been performed,
using the Scyther tool, against all automatic Scyther claims, except
the secrecy of data sent in plain text. The verification script can
be found in Appendix A. No attacks were detected through the
mechanical formal verification.
Protocol 1 Public-key Based Protocol
1: TT → T I : CertAuth (TT ) | |IDTT | |nTT
2: T I → TT : EPKTT {IDT I | |IDTT | |nT I | |nTT | |K | |IRseq}
| |SSKT I [K | |nTT ]| |CertAuth (T I )
3: T I → TT : EK {IDT I | |IDTT | |nT I | |nTT | |IRtiminд}
4: TT → T I : EK {IDT I | |IDTT | |nT I | |nTT | |approval | |SSKTT [nT I ]}
–Message 1: Device TT sends to device TI its public key certifi-
cate CertAuth (TT ), its ID IDTT , and a random nonce nTT .
– Message 2: TI verifies the received certificate. If it is gen-
uine, device TI encrypts, using the public key of device TT, its ID
IDT I , IDTT , random nonces nT I , and nTT , a session key K , and the
random-bit sequence that is emitted through the infrared channel
IRseq. The aforementioned encrypted message, along with the RSA
public key certificate of device TI, and a signature on K , and nTT –
using the private key of device TI – are sent to device TT.
– Message 3: Device TI sends to device TT, IDT I , IDTT , nT I ,
nTT , and the time required until it was capable of emitting infrared
signals IRseq. The data is encrypted with the session key K . This
message is separated from the previous for performance reasons, as
IRtiminд is available after the infrared sequence is emitted, during
which time IRseq can be sent.
–Message 4: If the certificate of device TI, as well as the signa-
ture from Message 2 are verified, device TT proceeds to compute
the emitted and captured infrared bit similarity. Device TT takes a
decision and responds with an approval or rejection message. The
decision message, along with IDT I , IDTT ,nT I ,nTT , and a signature
2wdiff: https://www.gnu.org/software/wdiff/
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on nT I – using the private key of device TT – are sent to device TI.
The message is encrypted using key K (as in Message 3).
3.2.2 Symmetric Key Based Protocol. In the field of smart tick-
eting, protocols are often based on symmetric key cryptography.
For example, the MIFARE Plus card [8], and the Calypso ticketing
system [4]. In the case of the MIFARE Plus card, in order for the
security of the system to be maintained in case the key of a card is
compromised, each card uses a different key. The terminal contains
amaster key, fromwhich the symmetric key of a card/smartphone is
derived, through a process called symmetric key diversification [1].
The card provides the Unique Identification number (UID), the Ap-
plication ID (AID), and the System Identifier (SID) to the terminal.
This information is used as input to the diversification process in
order for device TT to generate the key stored in device TI.
In a smartphone-based transaction, a dynamic element should
also be included in the diversification process, possibly provided
by the scheme operator. Wthout a dynamic element, a device with
a compromised key would not be able to be used for this type of
transaction again. Replacing the device in such scenarios is expen-
sive. However, developing a diversification process that takes as
input dynamic elements is out of the scope of this paper.
A symmetric key cryptography-based protocol was designed
(Protocol 2) and undergone mechanical formal verification, using
Scyther, against all automatic Scyther claims. The verification script
can be found in Appendix B. No attacks were detected through
mechanical formal verification.
Protocol 2 Symmetric-key Based Protocol
1: T I → TT : Key Diversification Information
2: TT → T I : EK {IDTT | |nTT }
3: T I → TT : EK {IDT I | |IDTT | |nT I | |nTT | |IRseq}
4: T I → TT : EK {IDT I | |IDTT | |nT I | |nTT | |hash[IRseq]
| |IRtiminд}
5: TT → T I : EK {IDT I | |IDTT | |nT I | |nTT | |hash[IRseq]
| |approval }
–Message 1: Device TI sends the information used by the diver-
sification algorithm in order for device TT to generate the symmet-
ric key K . A symmetric key compromise in a MIFARE card scenario
requires replacement of the card, as the diversification data is static.
Replacing a mobile device in such scenarios is very expensive and
impractical. Therefore, the diversification information in this sce-
nario includes the Device ID and a dynamic ID that can change in
case the original key is compromised.
–Message 2: Device TT sends its ID IDTT , and a random nonce
nTT to device TI. The message is encrypted using the symmetric
key K , which is pre-shared between the two devices.
– Message 3: TI responds with its ID IDT I , IDTT , random
nonces nT I , and nTT , and the random-bit sequence that is emitted
through infrared IRseq. The message is encrypted using key K .
–Message 4:Upon completion of the emission of the random-bit
sequence through infrared, device TI sends the emission initiation
time IRtiminд to device TT. Themessage also contains the identities
and the random nonces generated by the two devices, as well as
the hash of IRseq. The last element is provided so that an attacker
is not capable of flipping the message order of messages 2 and 3.
This message is also encrypted using the key K .
–Message 5: Using the provided IRseq and IRtiminд, device TT
returns a rejection or approval message to device TI. The approval,
along with IDT I , IDTT , nT I , nTT and a hash on IRseq are sent
encrypted with key K to device TI.
3.3 Evaluation Framework
In order to evaluate the performance of the protocols and the pro-
posed architecture, working prototypes were built. In all scenarios,
as device TT we used a laptop running Fedora 25, with an i7-2620M
CPU at 2.70GHz processor, and 8GB of RAM. Device TI was repre-
sented by a Samsung S5 mini (SM-G800F) device, running Android
5.1.1. The device is regarded to be of low/medium specifications.
Two applications were built for each device, one for the evaluation
of each of the two protocols. Both protocols are relevant in the
case of contactless transactions, since public key cryptography is
suggested in the cases of contactless payments and physical access
control, and symmetric key in the case of transportation ticketing.
An NFC-reader (ACS ACR1281-C1) was attached to device TT.
The applications for device TT were developed in Python, using the
pyscard library3, in order to control the NFC-reader. Android appli-
cations were developed in Java, using Host-based Card Emulation
(HCE) [12] in order to control the NFC adapter of the device.
Raw infrared data captured in [21] was used for the emulation
of infrared emission/capture. In order to further weigh potential
impact on the performance of the system, device TI was emitting
infrared signals during the time of the transaction. The perfor-
mance impact of capturing infrared data is minimal. A Raspberry
Pi, with an infrared receiver connected to its General Purpose Input
Output (GPIO) pins was used to measure the system load when
receiving infrared signals. The liblirc library4 was used, and the
performance burden on the device was negligible.
3.3.1 Public Key Based. In the first scenario, which applies in
domains that require the use of public key cryptography in contact-
less transactions, 2048-bit RSA was used. Each device contained a
public key pair, used for the transaction.
Upon the establishment of the session key, AES 128-bit encryp-
tion, using the CBC mode and PKCS5 padding, was used. All the
keys and nonceswere randomly generated, using the SecureRandom
Java class on device TI, and the Random module of the pycrypto
Python library on device TT.
The bit-similarity comparison between the captured and trans-
mitted infrared sequence was performed by device TT, upon re-
ceiving the third message. Bits captured outside the time frame dur-
ing which device TI was transmitting were discarded. The wdiff
tool was then called through the check_output module of the
subprocess Python library. The similarity percentage was returned
to the application running on device TT. The approval flag was
finally sent as part of the last message to device TI, based on that
percentage (0x01 if the similarity percentage was equal or exceeded
the threshold of 98%, otherwise 0x00).
3pyscard library: https://pyscard.sourceforge.io/
4liblirc library: http://www.lirc.org/
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3.3.2 Symmetric Key Based. Similar to the public key-based sce-
nario, 128-bit AES, CBC mode, with PKCS5 padding was used. The
bit-similarity comparison was performed upon receiving the fourth
message, by device TT, in the same way as in the public key-based
scenario. The key diversification code, according to the document
AN10922 [1], was integrated by modifying the implementation
in [13]. Finally, SHA256 was used as the hashing algorithm.
3.4 Results
Each of the protocols was run 100 times in order to estimate the
performance of the system, and evaluate the applicability in con-
tactless transaction scenarios. The performance measurements can
be found in Table 1. The measurements were taken by device TT
and represent the round trip time (i.e. the time between device
TT starts generating a message and the response that comes from
device TI is processed). Since the clocks of the two devices cannot
be perfectly synchronised, practically measuring the timing of each
individual message was not feasible. In the first message of each
protocol, the timing of the SELECT command is also included.
The last column lists the results of the second protocol, with
lower number of bits transmitted (300 bits), for better integration
with transport related contactless transactions, which require a time
restriction of 300 − 500ms (further discussion in Section 3.5). The
minimum and maximum observed timings in the 100 protocol runs,
and the average running time are listed, for each of the protocol
messages, the time required for the comparison of the transmitted
and captured bit-streams, and the total protocol running time.
Table 1: Results of Contactless Transactions (inms)
Protocol 1 Protocol 2 Protocol 2 (300b)
min max avg min max avg min max avg
Diversification - - - 30.2 42.4 39.0 28.1 50.5 38.8
Round Trip 1 116.1 169.4 152.2 26.6 81.5 32.6 21.9 40.9 27.6
Round Trip 2 95.7 135.5 109.4 146.6 201.5 194.7 95.5 115.2 109.0
Round Trip 3 52.1 133.7 70.1 24.4 32.1 27.2 24.6 38.0 28.6
Bit Similarity 3.8 5.9 4.3 3.8 5.2 4.5 3.5 5.2 4.1
Total 304.9 395.4 331.8 284.3 299.7 293.5 193.8 215.0 204.0
3.5 Discussion
The results indicate that the running time of the first protocol are
within the timing bounds that EMV requires. Even though the in-
frared emission lasts 100ms , the average total emission time was
approximately 227ms . The aforementioned emission time refers to
the time between requesting the infrared sequence emission from
the operating system, until the completion of the process. After in-
spection of the Android Open Source Project’s (AOSP) source code5,
we concluded that this delay is imposed either by the proprietary
infrared drivers, or by modifications on Android’s source code by
Samsung. Since access to the source code of these components is
not available, due to their proprietary nature, we were not able
to investigate the problem further. However, we were capable of
emitting infrared signals, using an infrared LED attached to the
GPIO pins of a Raspberry Pi, controlled by a program written in
5AOSP: https://source.android.com/
the C language, with negligible delay. Therefore, we believe that
this delay can be confined. An average extra performance cost
of approximately 57ms and 82ms was measured in the public and
symmetric key scenarios respectively, in the case of 500 bits.
It should be stressed that the measured performance is an indica-
tor of the performance cost of NFC contactless transactions, using
the proposed solution. An additional barrier was the multitude of
EMV and physical access control implementations, as well as the
limited available information regarding major transport ticketing
protocols. However, industry standards, like the EMV, were used
as guidelines for developing and delivering a robust solution.
In a real-world scenario, more information is exchanged between
the devices as part of the transactions, that is not covered by our
protocols. Real-world applications, after the establishment of a
secure channel between the devices involved in a transaction, would
require to transfer the random-bit sequence, and the total emission
time, in order for the similarity comparison to be performed.
Since some transportation ticketing transactions require to be
completed within 300 − 500ms , as mentioned earlier, the perfor-
mance of the second protocol might not be optimal for some slower
devices. Therefore, we repeated the experiment with a reduced
number of random bits. A total of 300 randomly generated bits
were generated in the second experimental round, constituting an
emission time of 60ms The probability of an attacker guessing the
random sequence, assuming its true random nature, is 1
2300
.
The average performance of the protocol run was improved,
with potential to successfully be integrated into such protocols.
The average total emission time, caused due to the abovementioned
delay in the emission was 137ms . An average extra performance
cost of approximately 32ms was introduced due to the issue.
4 CONTINUOUS TWO-FACTOR
AUTHENTICATION
In order to add an extra layer of security, access to websites, services,
or systems, may require an extra verification step in addition to the
login credentials. This second layer of security is often referred to as
Two-Factor Authentication (2FA). A widely adopted 2FA technique
is the use of a one time password (OTP), which can be sent to the
user via SMS, generated by an application on the user’s device, or
other means. In the case of host-based 2FA, hardware tokens, like
smart cards or OTP generators, are often used. Upon the successful
completion of the login credentials, users are typically requested to
proceed by providing the 2FA information in order to successfully
complete the login process. Access to a service that provides 2FA
functionality is only granted upon successful completion of both
authentication steps.
Using an OTP as a second factor usually requires input of the
OTP once per session. Depending on the system settings, a session
may last for several months, without requesting an OTP again.
Continuous authentication is not achieved in this case. Moreover,
being able to provide the OTP to the service does not imply the
user’s physical presence close to the device. Shoulder surfing attacks
can be used for example by attackers in order to compromise the
OTP and login in a remote location [14], as the expiration time of
these passwords can be several seconds long.
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In the case of smart cards, an extra cost is associated, and distance
bounding protocols may not be applicable in order to counter relay
attacks [39]. The multi-process nature of the host (e.g. a server or
a personal computer), the operating system and its configuration,
and the hardware variability do not assist towards this direction.
We are hence proposing a 2FA model, based on the principle
of infrared as a proximity detection method, capable of providing
continuous authentication, while eliminating the risk of attacks,
like shoulder surfing and relay attacks. In this scenario, the secure
primary channel is established over WiFi or Bluetooth between
devices TT and TI (a personal computer and a smartphone, respec-
tively). The second channel is the infrared channel, as described in
the previous sections. Further discussion on the architecture can
be found in Section 4.2.
4.1 Threat Model
Since relay attack detection is based on the comparison of data
captured by both devices TT and TI, both devices should be trusted.
In case device TT is not trusted, captured data can be manipulated
or delayed, which can lead to a false proximity result. In the case of
a website, which can be accessed from multiple devices, device TT
cannot be considered trusted. By requiring some trusted execution
environment, like Intel SGX [15], trust in device TT can be obtained.
However, even though a relay attack might not be applicable in this
scenario, an attacker in the vicinity to device TI can successfully
login using a computer (e.g. a Raspberry Pi), which is controlled
locally or remotely. Therefore, this technique is only applicable in
scenarios where logging in to a service can be achieved through a
single, trusted device, like user login to an operating system and
other host-based services.
Similar to contactless transactions, in order for an attacker to
perform a relay attack, a relay pair TT′ – TI′ is required. The goal
of the attacker is to be able to successfully relay infrared signals
in a timely manner. Since the same design principles described in
Section 2.3 are used, an attacker has a very limited window for
caching infrared signals and replaying them at a remote location.
4.2 Candidate Integration Architecture
The generic architecture of the proposed system is depicted in Fig-
ure 4. When a user logs in to a system that supports the proposed
solution, a communication initiates with an underlying service,
responsible for the 2FA process. In order to provide continuous
authentication, the service is called periodically (e.g. every 15 sec-
onds). Whenever the service is called, it communicates with device
TI through a secure WiFi or Bluetooth channel. Device TI must be
running an application capable of communicating with the service.
The application running on device TI should be linked to the service
that device TT is attempting to login to (e.g. by prior login of the
user to the mobile application).
Depending on the settings of the service, the underlying service
can be called periodically and request from device TI to provide
an authentication token, in the form of random infrared bits. If
the authentication is unsuccessful, an action is taken. Actions can
vary, according to the requirements of the service. For example, the
active session on device TT can be discontinued.
Figure 4: Architecture of Two-Factor Authentication
Since the success of the authentication transaction depends on
the orientation of the two devices (i.e. whether the infrared blaster
is aligned with the infrared receiver), less drastic measures might
be taken instead. For example, permission escalation can be used
to restrict access to certain critical actions and directories.
Either of the two protocols described in Section 3.2 can be used
for the establishment of the secure channel, depending on the re-
quirements and the implementation. For example, a symmetric key
can be shared during the setup process, by asking the user to scan a
barcode. The key can be periodically updated, but this is out of the
scope of this paper. In a multi-user environments, such keys can
be generated through symmetric key diversification. In the case
of multi-user environments, public key cryptography might be a
better option for logging user access.
4.3 Evaluation Framework
The same devices described in Section 3.3 were used in this sce-
nario as well as devices TI and TT. Instead of an NFC adapter, two
alternate primary communication channels were examined; WiFi
and Bluetooth.
In order to evaluate the applicability and performance of the pro-
posed architecture, a working prototype was built. An application
was developed in Java, represented the application that requires
2FA as part of the authentication process. In order for a user to
remain logged in, the successful completion of the 2FA had to be
achieved. Otherwise, a failure message was displayed and access
to certain components of the application was restricted. The 2FA
service was called every 15 seconds, in order to provide continuous
authentication assurance.
Four Android and four Python applications were built for TI and
TT, respectively, in order to assess all the possible combinations.
Namely, both protocols described in Section 3.2 were implemented
for each of the two primary channel options (WiFi and Bluetooth)
applicable to this scenario. In the case of WiFi, the two devices
were connected to the same wireless network, while in the case
of Bluetooth, a pairing between the devices had to be established
before the initiation of the 2FA process. The pairing was performed
through the Python applications, using the PyBluez library6.
Upon initialisation of the application requiring 2FA, a call to-
wards the underlying service was triggered. The service, written in
Python, would then establish a connection to device TI, in the case
of Bluetooth. In the case of WiFi, no session was required, since
the communication was performed through UDP packets. Device
TT would then request from device TI to initiate a transaction,
6PyBluez library: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/PyBluez
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through the established Bluetooth RFCOMM channel, or a UDP
packet. Upon transmission of the message, device TT would begin
listening for infrared signals through an infrared receiver for 100ms .
Upon receiving the message, device TI would start emitting infrared
signals through its infrared blaster. Infrared data captured in [21]
was used in this case as well. Communication would proceed in
parallel through both channels. Using the wdiff tool, device TT
would compute the similarity between the emitted and captured
infrared sequences. If the similarity threshold was reached, upon
completion of the protocol, the Python service would allow access
to certain elements of the application.
4.4 Results and Discussion
The results of 100 protocol runs over WiFi and 100 over Bluetooth
are presented in tables 2 and 3, respectively. For each protocol, the
minimum, maximum, and average running time are listed.
Table 2: Results of 2FA – WiFi (inms)
Protocol 1 Protocol 2
min max avg min max avg
Diversification - - - 2.6 5.2 2.7
Round Trip 1 21.7 98.0 30.3 6.2 67.9 8.6
Round Trip 2 131.5 252.6 201.2 162.1 277.3 224.2
Round Trip 3 16.8 62.1 22.6 6.3 18.2 7.9
Bit Similarity 4.0 6.9 4.7 3.9 10.6 4.6
Total 246.3 305.2 254.2 238.4 297.3 243.3
Table 3: Results of 2FA – Bluetooth (inms)
Protocol 1 Protocol 2
min max avg min max avg
Diversification - - - 2.6 3.5 2.7
Round Trip 1 74.3 182.2 116.9 52.1 153.9 76.9
Round Trip 2 123.2 200.6 175.2 129.0 262.3 209.9
Round Trip 3 54.5 144.7 70.7 35.4 154.3 57.2
Bit Similarity 3.9 5.7 4.6 3.8 13.5 4.6
Total 323.6 440.1 362.8 306.2 426.2 346.8
The results indicate the effectiveness of the proposed solution.
The overhead of the process was minimal, and the effectiveness
high. From a usability perspective, the setup process needs to be
completed once, and thereafter the user only has to place device TI
to be facing towards device TT. In order to enhance the security of
the system, the user can be required to unlock the device in order
for the process to initiate.
A usability concern may rise when the user needs to use device
TI in order to make or receive a call, while using device TT. A
temporal suspension of the continuous authentication process can
be applied in this occasion, in case an initial login using both factors
has already been completed.
An attacker with access to device TT can further use techniques
in order to compromise the system. For example, modify the security
parameters by externally plugging the hard drive to a computer.
Disk encryption can assist towards the prevention of such attacks.
Finally, since no time restrictions apply in this scenario, the
natural ambient environment can be used instead of generating
artificial ambience. However, manipulation or prediction of the
natural ambient environment might be possible. For example, if
the room temperature is used to detect proximity, a heater can be
used in order to alter the values to the attacker’s benefit. In case of
ambient sound, an attacker can compromise the system by following
the habits of a legitimate user. When a user is watching a TV show,
the attacker can produce the same ambient sound, and successfully
authenticate. Attacks on using the sound as a proximity detection
mechanism have been described and demonstrated in previous
works [25, 36]. Finally, in the case of light, an attacker can cover
the light sensor of device TT when device TI is in the pocket of the
legitimate user, and gain access to the system.
5 OTHER SCENARIOS
Other scenarios, that are either not in compliance with the context
of this paper (Section 5.1), or are covered by the aforementioned
scenarios (Section 5.2), are described in this section.
5.1 2FA for Logging In to Web Services
An attacker who has the ability to place a device in the vicinity of
TI, may be able to successfully login, using the standard procedure.
Although this is not a relay attack, as no data is being relayed
between devices TI and TT, access to the legitimate user’s account
can be achieved. In scenarios where a relay attack is not of concern,
infrared emission can operate as a 2FA provider, without requiring
device TT to be trusted. For example if an attacker has compromised
the credentials of a user, but does not have access to the vicinity of
device TI. Since the main objective of this paper is to provide anti-
relay capabilities in real-world scenarios, and the aforementioned
case does not fit this context, it is listed as a future work direction.
As a note, we would like to stress that in such scenario the
authentication must not be performed by device TT, but by the
service provider, or device TI. Since device TT is not trusted, the
overall architecture of the system in this occasion should be modi-
fied. The resulting architecture should be similar to the architecture
of Sound-Proof, as described by Karapanos et al. in [25]. In their
proposal the use of ambient sound is employed in order to provide
device proximity proof and use it as a means of zero-effort 2FA.
The work is mostly focused on usability, and potential security
problems have been discussed by both the authors and by Shrestha
et al. in [36]. We believe that most of the discussed security threats
can be eliminated by replacing sound with a randomly generated
infrared sequence, however some usability might be diminished.
5.2 Internet of Things Co-Presence Verification
In many occasions, in order for Internet of Things (IoT) devices to
achieve their intended operation, proximity should be guaranteed.
For example, in a security system, in order to avoid blind spots, in
many cases devices should be located within visibility range. An
attacker can move some components of the security system and
apply a relay attack in order to deceit the system.
By applying the proposed solution, proximity evidence can be
provided among such devices. A similar approach to the ones de-
scribed in this paper can be applied. When one IoT device requests
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proximity evidence from another, the same procedure is executed,
with the requesting device acting as device TT and the proving
device as device TI. In this scenario, the IoT devices of the system
should be considered as trusted as well.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper we investigated the integration of infrared as an
artificial ambient environment actuator for relay attack prevention
in different real-world scenarios. Existing industry standards were
taken into consideration, where applicable. Contactless transactions
(EMV payments, physical access control, and transport ticketing),
as well as continuous host-based two-factor authentication were
investigated. Online two-factor authentication, and IoT co-presence
verification were also discussed.
Integration architectures were described, and working proto-
types were built and evaluated. Proposed protocols were undergone
mechanical formal evaluation. Our results indicated that integra-
tion of the proposed solution with existing industry standards can
be used to counter relay attacks, and is in compliance with current
operational timing requirements, where applicable.
As part of our ongoing investigation, we are planning to extend
this work in various directions. We are planning to examine the
use of infrared light for continuous two-factor authentication for
online logins. Also, to perform a user study in order to assess the
usability of the proposed countermeasure. Finally, to investigate
other AAE actuators, such as vibration and sound.
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4 secret Cert: Function;
5
6 protocol protPK(TI,TT) {
7 role TI {
8 fresh nti: Nonce;
9 var ntt: Nonce;
10 fresh IRSeq: IRsequence;
11 fresh IRTiming: Ticket;
12 var Y: Ticket;
13 fresh K: SessionKey;
14 recv_1(TT ,TI, TT,ntt ,Cert(TT));
15 send_2(TI ,TT, {TI,TT,nti ,ntt ,K,IRSeq}pk(TT),{h
(K,ntt)}sk(TI),Cert(TI));
16 send_3(TI ,TT, {TI,TT,nti ,ntt ,IRTiming}K);
17 recv_4(TT ,TI, {TI,TT,nti ,ntt ,Y,{h(nti)}sk(TT)}
K);
18
19 claim(TI , Alive);
20 claim(TI , Secret , K);
21 claim(TI , Secret , nti);
22 claim(TI , Niagree);
23 claim(TI , Nisynch);
24 claim(TI , Secret , IRSeq);
25 claim(TI , Secret , IRTiming);
26 claim(TI , Secret , Y);
27 }
28
29 role TT {
30 var nti: Nonce;
31 fresh ntt: Nonce;
32 var X: Ticket;
33 var Y: Ticket;
34 fresh apprv: Ticket;
35 var K: SessionKey;
36 send_1(TT ,TI, TT,ntt ,Cert(TT));
37 recv_2(TI ,TT, {TI,TT,nti ,ntt ,K,X}pk(TT),{h(K,
ntt)}sk(TI),Cert(TI));
38 recv_3(TI ,TT, {TI,TT,nti ,ntt ,Y}K);
39 send_4(TT ,TI, {TI,TT,nti ,ntt ,apprv ,{h(nti)}sk(
TT)}K);
40
41 claim(TT , Alive);
42 claim(TT , Secret , K);
43 claim(TT , Secret , nti);
44 claim(TT , Niagree);
45 claim(TT , Nisynch);
46 claim(TT , Secret , X);
47 claim(TT , Secret , Y);
48 claim(TT , Secret , apprv);
49 }
50 }




4 macro K = k(TI,TT);
5
6 symmetric -role protocol protSK(TI,TT) {
7 role TI {
8 fresh nti: Nonce;
9 var ntt: Nonce;
10 fresh IRSeq: IRsequence;
11 fresh IRTiming: IRsequence;
12 var Y: Ticket;
13 recv_1(TT,TI, {TT,ntt}K);
14 send_2(TI,TT, {TI,TT,nti ,ntt ,IRSeq}K);
15 send_3(TI,TT, {TI,TT,nti ,ntt ,h(IRSeq),IRTiming
}K);





21 claim(TI, SKR , ntt);
22 claim(TI, SKR , nti);
23 claim(TI, Secret , IRSeq);
24 claim(TI, Secret , IRTiming);
25 claim(TI, Secret , Y);
26 }
27
28 role TT {
29 var nti: Nonce;
30 fresh ntt: Nonce;
31 var X: Ticket;
32 var Y: Ticket;
33 fresh apprv: Ticket;
34 send_1(TT,TI, {TT,ntt}K);
35 recv_2(TI,TT, {TI,TT,nti ,ntt ,X}K);
36 recv_3(TI,TT, {TI,TT,nti ,ntt ,h(X),Y}K);





42 claim(TT, SKR , ntt);
43 claim(TT, SKR , nti);
44 claim(TT, Secret , X);
45 claim(TT, Secret , Y);
46 claim(TT, Secret , apprv);
47 }
48 }
